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A B S T R A C T
This article analyses the debt of local governments taking into account the presence of spatial interactions
among neighbouring municipalities. To this end, the S2SLS and Spatial lag models were applied to a sample
of 527 municipalities located in the Valencian Community (Spain) for the year 2015. The main results reveal
a spatial correlation in outstanding debt among municipalities. The gender of the mayor, the grants and
transfers received and the average payment period have direct effects on outstanding debt. In turn, the net
savings index, inactive population, local income and the strength of the ruling political party have indirect
effects on the municipal debt and indirect spatial effects on the debt of the neighbouring municipalities.
©2018 ASEPUC. Published by EDITUM - Universidad de Murcia. This is an open access article under the









La importancia de los efectos espaciales en la deuda municipal
R E S U M E N
Este artículo analiza la deuda de los gobiernos locales teniendo en cuenta la presencia de interacciones
espaciales entre los municipios vecinos. Para ello se utiliza una muestra 527 municipios de la Comunidad
Valenciana, para el año 2015 y se aplican los modelos espaciales S2SLS y Spatial lag. Los principales
resultados obtenidos muestran la existencia de autocorrelacion espacial en la deuda viva entre los
municipios. Las variables género del alcalde, índice de subvenciones y transferencias recibidas y el periodo
medio de pago presentan efectos directos sobre la deuda viva. Mientras que, el índice de ahorro neto, la
población no activa, la renta local y la fortaleza política tienen efectos directos en la deuda del municipio y
efectos espaciales indirectos en la deuda de los municipios vecinos.
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Introduction
Public debt is an indicator for measuring a country’s fin-
ancial health. In Spain, the volume of debt has steadily in-
creased, notably since the start of the global economic crisis.
Given its volume and importance, European and national le-
gislation has had to adapt to the situation, imposing strict
limits to be met at central, regional and local levels. The im-
portance of the topic has led to numerous studies in the liter-
ature analysing local debt in its different aspects, such as the
success or failure of the debt limits, or the determinants of
debt, among others. However, few studies analyse the exist-
ence of neighbourhood interdependencies on debt decisions.
The only contributions we are aware of are Borck, Fossen,
Freier and Martin (2015), Kopczewska, Kuda, Walczyk and
Kocia (2016), whose studies analyse the spatial effect in the
German municipalities and EU countries, respectively.
This paper therefore aims to go beyond the classic ap-
proach of indebtedness, by analysing whether neighbouring
interdependencies exist in municipal debt decisions, that is,
whether an increase in the debt level of one municipality
might affect that of the neighbouring municipality. In today’s
globalised world, the effect of interconnectivity and techno-
logical development seems to be that nothing happens ran-
domly. This has motivated some authors to hypothesise that
local governments do not make decisions in isolation, but
take into account the decisions adopted by their neighbours.
Spatial interactions among municipalities and their influence
on fiscal policy are increasingly attracting research attention.
Authors such as Bastida, Guillamón and Benito (2013b), Er-
mini and Santolini (2010); Foucault, Madies and Paty (2008)
and López, Martínez-Ortiz and Cegarra-Navarro (2017) high-
light the existence of similar spatial behaviours in localities in
spending, that is, spending levels in one municipality are in-
fluenced by the spending decisions adopted by neighbouring
municipalities.
In this article, we focus on the determinants of local debt,
specifically on the spatial effects of debt among Valencian
(Spain) local governments for the year 2015. In this case,
the literature is much scarcer. In fact, our study is the first to
examine this question for Spanish municipalities. A further
contribution of the study is the inclusion of the variable av-
erage payment period to suppliers, which has not been ana-
lysed in previous research, in order to examine its possible
effects on the level of municipal debt.
Our results show the presence of spatial autocorrelation
in public debt. Overall, the gender of the mayor, grants and
transfers received and average payment period to suppliers
show direct spatial effects on current debt. Net savings, in-
active population, inhabitants’ income level and the political
strength of the governing party have direct spatial effects on
municipal debt and indirect effects on the debt of neighbour-
ing municipalities.
This study is structured in five sections. Following this in-
troduction, the next section reviews some relevant literature
on debt and spatial patterns, and defines the hypotheses to be
tested. The third section outlines and justifies the sample and
specifies the model. Section four presents the main results,
and the conclusions of the analysis are presented in section
five.
Previous literature and hypotheses
A review of the literature on local debt
Government debt has been analysed from various differ-
ent perspectives in recent years. Research interest in public
debt has grown since the onset of the recent economic crisis,
which at the same time ushered in far-reaching legislative
changes. The extensive literature can be classified into sev-
eral groups according to the analytical focus taken.
The first group includes studies analysing the determining
factors of debt (Balaguer-Coll, Prior & Tortosa-Ausina, 2016;
Bastida & Benito, 2005; Benito & Bastida, 2004; Benito, Guil-
lamón & Bastida, 2015a; Cabasés, Pascual & Vallés, 2007;
Guillamón, Benito & Bastida, 2011; Pérez-López, Plata, Zafra-
Gómez & López-Hernández, 2013; Ribeiro & Jorge, 2014).
A second group explores legal debt limits and their success
or failure (Allers, 2015; Benito et al., 2015a; Cabasés et al.,
2007; Vallés, Pascual & Cabasés, 2003; Vila, 2012). In a re-
cent article, Olmo (2018) analyses the explanatory factors
and the limitations of Spanish debt. His main conclusions
suggest that the budget stability regulation, provided for in
Law 2/2012, of April 27, on Budgetary Stability and Finan-
cial Sustainability, has not had a significant effect on the re-
duction of accumulated municipal debt. However, the au-
thor notes that this regulation has contributed to changing
the trend of indebtedness in Spanish municipalities.
Another line of research includes studies on the relation-
ship between electoral cycles and debt as a financial resource
(Bastida, Beyaert & Benito, 2013a; Cabaleiro-Casal, Buch-
Gómez & Vaamonde, 2014; García-Sánchez, Prado-Lorenzo
& Cuadrado-Ballesteros, 2011; Vicente, Ríos & Guillamón,
2013). In this line, Clinger, Feiock, McCabe and Park (2008)
examine local debt in U.S. cities by considering turnover
among local government officials and its influence on debt.
They conclude that debt is not only affected by the economic
situation facing local governments, but also by the decisions
taken in uncertain political contexts driven by political incent-
ives.
A further area of analysis explores the possible relationship
between debt level and fiscal consolidation (Andrews, 2015)
or budget transparency and debt (Ríos, Bastida & Benito,
2016).
Other studies analyse the relationship between decent-
ralisation of municipal services and debt levels (Brusca,
Montesinos & Mora, 2012; Zafra-Gómez, Pedauga, Plata-
Díaz & López-Hernández, 2014) and the creation of special
districts and the increase of debt in the United States (Faulk
& Killian, 2017). The literature on debt includes the work
of Pérez-López, Plata, Zafra-Gómez and López-Hernández
(2014), who analyse the setting up of instrumental bodies
that allow local governments to exclude part of the debt from
their budgets. These authors show how municipalities that
outsource more of their services and have a higher number
of consortiums also have lower debt levels.
The final field of study, which has attracted less analytical
attention at both national and international levels, applies
spatial econometrics instruments to examine the existence of
similar debt patterns among public administrations (Borck et
al., 2015; Kopczewska et al., 2016).
Spatial effects in the financial situation of territorial author-
ities
The literature on spatial patterns in local taxes provides
evidence of tax mimicking among municipalities (Allers &
Elhorst, 2005; Cassette, Di Porto & Foremny, 2012; Delgado
& Mayor, 2011). The work of Álvarez and Barbero (2016)
highlights the importance of spatial effects of tax income on
growth in Spanish regional economies, analysing at the same
time competition among regions for public resources.
Recent studies have sought spatial relationships between
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neighbouring units with reference to specific expenditure
items. In Spain, authors such as Bastida et al. (2013b) and
López et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence of spatial ef-
fects in municipal expenditure. Ermini and Santolini (2010)
and Foucault et al. (2008) find similar spatial patterns in
Italian and French municipalities, respectively.
In line with the previous research, Kopczewska at al.
(2016) carried out a broad study on the existence and mag-
nitude of the spatial effects of debt in EU countries. These au-
thors observe that taxes have a considerable spatial repercus-
sion on debt at the European level, confirming the existence
of global effects that influence the fiscal policy of the Euro-
zone. Pan, Zhang, Zhu and Wójcik (2017) find a pattern of
constant debt accumulation in Chinese municipalities due to
their increased income from taxes, which represents greater
capacity to return the debt they owe. Their main conclusions
identify spatial patterns in municipal debt, that is, the issue of
bonds as a local financing instrument in one city is related to
the amount of bonds issued by neighbouring cities. Borck at
al. (2015) study spatial patterns in German municipal debt
and uncover a robust spatial correlation. These authors con-
firm that if one local authority increases its debt level, this
has repercussions for its closest neighbour, which in turn in-
creases its own debt.
Finally, Zhang and Gibson (2017) observe spatial depend-
ency in the outsourcing of local services, indicating that de-
cisions to subcontract services to third parties are influenced
by the outsourcing decisions taken by their nearest neigh-
bouring local authorities.
Spatial effects in Spanish municipal debt
Economic management in local councils has worsened as
a result of the recent economic and financial crisis. Municip-
alities with high debt levels and budgetary deficit or those
receiving insufficient transfers are now opting to outsource
their services or are entering into inter-municipal collabora-
tion agreements (Zafra-Gómez et al., 2014). These develop-
ments led us to consider that municipal debt level may be
influenced by the level of debt in neighbouring municipalit-
ies. It is therefore of interest to analyse the variables used
in this study from the perspective of municipalities’ financial
condition. The present study takes this perspective to ana-
lyse four budgetary indicators: grants and transfers received
(GRANTS), net saving rate (NSR), capital expenditure (CE) and
average payment period (APP).
Grants and transfers received (GRANTS) may be defined as
an indicator that measures a municipality’s financial vulner-
ability, that is, how sensitive it is to external sources of fund-
ing from other levels of government. In turn, the net saving
rate (NSR) is the local authority’s capacity to generate addi-
tional resources once it has fulfilled its obligations, and may
be an indicator of its budgetary sustainability. Zafra-Gómez,
López-Hernández and Hernández-Bastida (2009) consider
net savings as an indicator of flexibility, which they refer to
as the capacity of local authorities to service borrowing with
their available resources. For its part, solvency at the services
level can be represented by the variable capital expenditure
(CE), defined as the capacity of local authorities to provide
facilities in order to offer adequate services. Finally, the av-
erage period of payment to suppliers (APP) is defined as an
indicator of cash solvency, that is, the authority’s ability to
generate liquidity to meet its short-term payment obligations.
Next, we will analyse the effects of these budgetary vari-
ables and others of a socio-economic and political nature
(Table 1).
Budget variables
Grants and transfers received (GRANTS)
Lago-Peñas (2008) finds that local authorities with higher
grants increase their expenditure level, and refers to this
effect as "fiscal replacement form of asymmetry". The au-
thor notes that, depending on the ruling political ideology,
grants are either used to reduce the debt or not. Specific-
ally, grants are used by conservative governments to reduce
their deficit because their income from taxes is lower. Pérez-
López et al. (2014) state that increase in subsidies correl-
ates negatively with local corporation indebtedness, because
their need for financing is reduced. Balaguer (2002), Bastida
and Benito (2005), and Pérez-López et al. (2013) report that
higher volumes of grants received coincide with debt reduc-
tion. However, Guillamón et al. (2011) and Levaggi and
Zanola (2003) find a positive relationship between grants re-
ceived and debt level. Bastida, Benito and Guillamón (2009)
find that transfers received increase local expenditure and
there are few incentives to use grants to reduce the local tax
burden. In light of the above, we propose the following hy-
pothesis:
H1: The volume of grants received has posit-
ive/negative effects on local debt.
Net savings rate (NSR)
According to Vallés et al. (2003), local authorities that im-
plement austerity policies in their current expenditure and
have an appropriate plan for debt reduction have greater fin-
ancing capacity; in other words they do not need excessive
debt to finance their capital investments. However, in their
analysis of nonfulfilment of debt limits, Benito et al. (2015a)
conclude that net saving is the most frequently breached
limit. Similarly, Vila (2012) analyses the evolution of net
savings as a determinant of compliance with legal debt lim-
its, finding a negative evolution. Balaguer (2002), Bastida
and Benito (2005), Brusca and Labrador (1998), Vallés et
al. (2003) and Pérez-López et al. (2013) find a negative re-
lation between net savings and municipal debt. Given the
significance of net saving to debt, we formulate our second
hypothesis:
H2: When net saving is higher, local debt is more
likely to decrease.
Capital expenditure (CE)
Capital expenditure is financed by capital transfers re-
ceived, current savings, income from urban development
taxes, or long-term loans, which increase municipal debt.
In this line, Benito, Vicente and Bastida (2015b) find a sig-
nificant and positive relationship between capital spending
and local debt. The studies by Balaguer-Coll et al. (2016),
Bastida and Benito (2005), Benito and Bastida (2004), Vallés
et al. (2003), Cabasés et al. (2007), and Pérez-López et
al. (2013) conclude that capital investment positively influ-
ences local debt, and that local debt is one of its determin-
ants. Zehms (1991) highlights the need to update capital
assets and their financing through opportune budgetary al-
locations in the budgets. According to this study, investment
spending, contained in budget reports, informs users about
the proportion of expenditure allocated to financing muni-
cipal investment. This leads us to the following hypothesis:
H3: When capital expenditure is higher, local debt
is more likely to increase.
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Table 1
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Average payment period (APP)
Organic Law 2/2012 on Budget Stability and Financial Sus-
tainability establishes a set of fiscal regulations that affect
local administrations through the principles of financial sta-
bility and sustainability, the expenditure rule, and the use
of budget surplus to pay off debt. To control commercial
late payments, the regulation stipulates the average period
of payment to local suppliers, setting a final payment date at
30 days of receiving the invoice. If the local administration
does not make the payment, it incurs interest on arrears that
increases the total debt. In this line, Pons (2017) runs an ana-
lysis of variance on the average payment period, as an indic-
ator of debt, of different types of local organisations, finding
that a large proportion of the municipalities analysed do not
comply with the regulation. Given the innovative nature of
the variable APP, we test its possible influence on municipal
debt with the following hypothesis:
H4: Compliance with the legal limit of period of
payment to suppliers reduces current debt.
Socio-economic variables
Income level (INCOME)
This variable has been used by Bastida et al. (2013a),
Benito et al. (2015b), Cabasés et al. (2007) and McEachern
(1978), among others, in their studies on debt. In his study
analysing how the electoral cycle influences municipal debt
per capita, Bastida (2013a) noted that an increase in the level
of income has a positive long-run effect on debt. Cabasés et
al. (2007) and McEachern (1978) found that the level of
debt is positively associated with a higher economic level. In
another study on the housing bubble and its consequences at
local government level, Benito et al. (2015b) found that eco-
nomic level does not affect public debt growth. Most studies
find a positive relationship of this variable with debt, indicat-
ing that wealthy states can handle new debt; that is, higher
per capita income levels lead to higher accumulated public
debt due to higher demand from citizens for goods and ser-
vices (Bastida & Benito, 2005; Clingermayer & Wood, 1995;
Cabasés et al., 2007; Guillamón et al., 2011; Kiewiet & Sza-
katy, 1996; Vallés et al., 2003). This leads us to formulate
the following hypothesis:
H5: Income level affects local debt positively.
Population density (DENS)
In the literature on debt, the relationship between pop-
ulation density and local debt growth is unclear, and has
led to many diverse conclusions. Bastida et al. (2009) re-
port that economies of scale are more likely to be present in
local authority expenditure, the higher the population dens-
ity. Benito et al. (2015b) state that population density is
negatively correlated with debt growth; that is, the need for
financing declines as population density increases. Bastida et
al. (2013b) conclude that the impact of population density
on different types of functional expenditure is negative. This
conclusion is explained by the fact that expenditure on street
cleaning and lighting in the town or city centre, among other
factors, does not vary according to number of inhabitants.
These authors find that municipalities with higher population
densities have lower current debt levels. However, Andrews
(2015) analyses vertical consolidation and financial sustain-
ability in English local authorities, finding that population
density is not a factor that determines an authority’s “fiscal
health”. In light of the above, we propose the following hy-
pothesis:
H6: The higher the population density, the greater
the possibility that the local debt level will be lower.
Retired people (RET)
Social services, resulting from local policies, lead to in-
creased public spending, which in turn affects debt level. So-
cial policies are associated with population segments, in that
the existence of vulnerable groups motivates social policies
with resulting increased service costs. In this vein, Hagen
and Vabo (2005) find evidence that older people have neg-
ative effects on public finance surplus; similarly, Rodríguez,
Navarro, Alcaide and López (2016) found evidence that cit-
izens over the age of 65 have a negative effect on the finan-
cial sustainability of local authorities. Hence, the needs of
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the retired population lead to an increase in the public ser-
vices provided and consequently the level of debt. However,
in contrast to these results, Ellis and Schansberg (1999) con-
cluded that population older than 65 was negatively related
to the level of state long-term debt. Taking these results into
account, we consider the effect of inactive population on the
amount of municipal debt an interesting question to examine,
and formulate the following hypothesis:
H7: The inactive population has positive/negative
effects on local debt.
Political variables
Election data from 2011 were used to define the political
variables (political strength, political inclination and gender
of the mayor), since current debt is an accumulated amount
and its volume is a result of past decisions.
Gender of the mayor (GEN)
Massolo (1996) highlights the importance of analysing
the gender variable in municipal studies. According to
Hernández-Nicolás, Martín-Ugedo and Mínguez-Vera (2018)
councils with women mayors have fewer annual interest and
debt repayment obligations and have higher expenditure on
security, protection, and social promotion. However, Brusca,
Rossi and Aversano (2015) found that mayor’s gender was
not significant in Spanish and Italian local authorities’ per
capita debt. Guillamón et al. (2011) and Gras, Hernandez
and Palacios (2014) found that the gender of the mayor is
not an explanatory factor of Spanish local debt.
Hamidullah, Riccucci and Pandey (2015) point out that
not only do men and women have different values of equity,
long-term perspective, sense of community and representa-
tion, but also differ in their values of efficiency, effectiveness
and experience. For their part, Carozzi and Gago (2017) ana-
lyse gender and social policies related to support for famil-
ies, preschool education and work, finding no empirical evid-
ence that women mayors are more likely to introduce such
policies. Clots-Figueras (2011) observes that when women
are responsible for political management, a positive impact
is seen in educational performance in urban areas of India.
Ferraz and Tejedo-Romero (2016) find that women’s role
in local Spanish politics was greater in the 2011 elections
than in the previous 2007 local elections. Ilcan, Oliver and
O’Connor (2007) studied the restructuring of the Canadian
public sector and women’s new political and economic role.
Green and Homroy (2018) evidence the positive and econom-
ically significant effects of women directors’ involvement on
company boards and committees. Bagues and Campa (2017)
identify increased gender quotas in local authorities, but find
no statistically significant evidence of change in the compos-
ition of public finance. The above arguments lead us to for-
mulate the following hypothesis:
H8: The mayor’s gender can affect local debt.
Herfindahl Index (HI)
Research analysing political strength and its consequences
for local debt has reached varying conclusions. Ashworth,
Geys and Heyndels (2005) find that more politically frag-
mented local governments have higher public deficits and
debt, due to the strategic use of debt by political coalitions.
Roubini and Sachs (1989) find that governments with a lar-
ger number political parties in coalition have higher levels of
public deficit; that is, the weaker the government, the higher
the deficit will be. Their analysis of strategic debt shows that
local governments probably prefer to take on higher debt as a
legacy for future governments, concluding that the effects of
political fragmentation have a long-term influence on muni-
cipal debt. Guillamón et al. (2011) show that the concentra-
tion of local government power influences debt level. Tovmo
(2007) and Rattsø and Tovmo (2002) conclude that political
fragmentation does not affect public deficit, and therefore
debt. Borge (1996) finds robust effects of political fragment-
ation on municipal debt, although politically strong govern-
ments are not confirmed to have lower debt levels. Hagen
and Vabo (2005) conclude that stronger political leadership
leads to higher fiscal performance and, therefore, improved
– that is, higher – budget balance. This lack of consensus mo-
tivates our objective to test the effects of political strength on
local debt.
To measure the degree of political competition in the muni-
cipalities analysed, we use the Herfindahl index, which takes
values between 0 and 1, depending on the number of council-
lors from each party represented in the council, with higher
values indicating a lower degree of political fragmentation
and, therefore, a lower degree of competition or higher de-
gree of political strength. Following Guillamón et al. (2011),







where Si is the number of councillors of party i in the local
government; and S is the total number of councillors. Taking
into account the above arguments, we formulate our next
hypothesis:
H9: Greater political fragmentation in local govern-
ments can increase/decrease local debt.
Political sign (SIGN)
The study by Rattsø and Tovmo (2002) shows that left-
wing parties are more likely to increase spending, without
raising income through taxes, as a result of their social
policies; this positively contributes to the public deficit,
which increases local debt. García-Sánchez et al. (2011) find
evidence for partisan budgetary cycles, noting that parties
with a left-wing ideology incur greater debt than conservat-
ive parties due to their political ideology. These authors show
that left-wing incumbents increase debt significantly more
than conservative governments during election periods in or-
der to improve their re-election chances. Kiewiet and Szakaty
(1996) find that conservative-run councils have lower levels
of debt.
In contrast, authors such as Cabaleiro-Casal et al. (2014)
note that ideology has a significant influence on debt level,
confirming that councils governed by political parties with no
clear ideological identity have lower debt levels. However,
these authors are unable to confirm significant differences
between conservative and left-wing parties in terms of debt
levels. For their part, Bastida and Benito (2005), Benito and
Bastida (2004), Guillamón et al. (2011) and Pérez-López et
al. (2013) conclude that political inclination does not have a
significant influence on municipal debt level. Finally, Bastida
et al. (2009) demonstrate that parties’ political ideology has
no clear influence on municipal expenditure, deducing from
this that ideology does not affect indebtedness. The above
arguments lead us to our final hypothesis:
H10: The political sign may or may not influence
municipal debt.
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Data and specification of the model
Sample and definition of variables
This study was carried out using a sample of town councils
from the Valencian Community (Spain) for which informa-
tion was available for the year 2015. The sample comprised
527 municipalities, representing 97% of all the municipal-
ities in the region. Table 2 displays the distribution of per
capita debt in the municipalities of the Valencian Community,
showing that small municipalities have higher debt levels per
capita than medium-sized or large municipalities.
Table 2























 able 2 
 istribution of municipalities and local debt (year 2015) 
 Municipalities Local debt 






% Debt per 
capita 
Below 1,000 208 39.47% 73043.37 35.56% 
1,001–3,000 123 23.34% 40842.54 19.88% 
3,001–5,000 41 7.78% 19767.08 9.62% 
5,001–10,000 57 10.82% 26682.17 12.99% 
10,001–20,000 33 6.26% 11352.83 5.53% 
20,001–50,000 50 9.49% 23134.39 11.26% 
50,001–100,000 11 2.08% 8282.71 4.03% 
Over 100,000 4 0.76% 2315.95 1.13% 
Total 527 100% 205421.05 100% 
The dependent variable that we analyse in this paper is
current debt (CD), which can be defined as the stock of gov-
ernment liabilities at the end of the period, measured at
nominal value. Currency and deposits, loans and debt se-
curities are the instruments that are included in the defini-
tion of general government gross debt in Council Regulation
(EC) No 479/2009 as amended by Commission Regulation
No 220/2014 (Maastricht debt). They are defined in terms
of the ESA 2010 classifications1.
Data for ‘current debt’ and ‘budget variables’ were taken
from the Ministry of Finance. Data for the variable ‘per capita
income’ are from the Klein Institute database. Information on
people over the age of 65, number of inhabitants, and square
kilometres for each locality came from the Spanish National
Statistics Institute. Data for the variable ‘gender of the mayor’
was provided on request by the central government’s Trans-
parency Portal. Finally, data on the political variables came
from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of
the Presidency and for the Territorial Administrations. De-
scriptive statistics of these variables are provided in Table 3.
Table 4 reports the frequencies of the dummy variables
(APP, GEN and SIGN), together with their percentage of the
variable ‘local debt’. The table shows that the majority of
local governments do not meet the stipulated average pay-
ment period for local suppliers (APP). Local governments that
pay their suppliers on time are also those with the lowest
levels of per capita debt. Most Valencian municipalities are
led by men (mayor’s gender GEN), and those with women
mayors have higher per capita debt levels. The political ideo-
1The defition of current debt can be found on the website of

























 able 3 
 escriptive statistics (2015) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log (CD) 4.199 2.825 0.000 8.852 
GRANTS 0.406    0.149    0.062 0.938 
NSR 0.091 0.166 -0.832 0.498 
CE 300.853 455.373 2.880 5007.601 
APP 0.474 0.500 0.000 1 
DENS 541.984 1965.978 0.520 26644.430 
INCOME 13666.380 20965.160 7578.296 471403.100 
RET 0.241 0.083 0.091 0.577 
GEN 0.194 0.396 0.000 1 
HI 0.450 0.133 0.174 1 
SIGN 0.676 0.469 0.000 1 
logy variable (SIGN) reveals that conservative parties out-
number left-wing parties, and their debt levels are higher.
Table 4











Frecuency of variables APP, GEN and SIGN in relation to 
local debt (2015) 
Variable Dummy Mean Std. Dev. Percentage Freq. 
APP 0 202.263 285.039 47.440 250 
 1 559.045 780.881 52.560 277 
GEN 0 384.496 650.832 80.650 425 
 1 411.868 503.404 19.350 102 
SIGN 0 360.961 501.226 32.450 171 
 1 403.642 676.229 67.550 356 
Model specification
Following the basic modelling strategy in the work of El-
horst (2010), we apply the ordinary least squares (OLS)
model to test for spatial dependence. Standard econometric
estimation methods are not suitable when spatial autocorrel-
ation is present, due to bias and inconsistency in the estim-
ates (Chasco, 2003; Hall, Karadas & Schlosky, 2016). This
is because of the endogeneity that characterises spatial mod-
els, which can be defined as linear models that represent spa-
tial effects of dependency or spatial autocorrelation. When
tests are applied to detect autocorrelation, namely Moran’s I,
Lagrange multiplier lag, Lagrange multiplier error and Lag-
range multiplier SARMA, they are shown to be significant:
that is, substantive and residual autocorrelation is observed.
Table 5 reports the results of these tests. Both the LM (lag)
test and the robust LM (lag) test show that spatial depend-
ence is substantive and is adapted to the SAR model, as spe-
cified by Anselin (2005). The test performed on the residual
model shows spatial dependence, but its robust version re-
jects this hypothesis. These results were confirmed by the
robust SARMA test.
The non-normal distribution of the residuals precludes the
application of the strategy to estimate the model with the
maximum likelihood (ML) method, presented in the spatial
literature by Elhorst (2010), and LeSage and Pase (2009,
2010, 2014). We therefore use spatial lag and two-stage
least squares (S2SLS) models as proposed in Bastida et al.
(2013b). To estimate the spatial lag model, we include the
spatially lagged dependent variable Wy as a further explan-
atory variable, in line with Chasco (2013). The spatial lag is
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Table 5
Spatial interactions of municipality debts
40	
	
 able 5 
 patial interactions of municipality debts  
                                                  Models  Spatial effects 
Variables                  S2SLS            Spatial lag  Direct effects Indirect effects Total effect 
ρ W log (CD) 0.3028 *** (0.1201) 0.3215 *** (0.1207)     
GRANTS -1.5647 * (0.9468) -1.5694 * (0.8354)  -1.6014e+00 * -7.1154e-01  -2.3130e+00 * 
NSR -3.0823 *** (0.6249) -3.0889 *** (0.5791)  -3.1521e+00 *** -1.4005e+00 * -4.5525e+00 *** 
CE -0.0003  (0.0002) -0.0003  (0.0003)  -3.1425e -04  -1.3963e- 04  -4.5388e-04  
APP 1.6068 *** (0.2572) 1.6101 *** (0.2436)  1.6430e+00 *** 7.3001e-01  2.3730e+00 *** 
INCOME 0.0000  (0.0000) 0.0000 *** (0.0000)  6.1071e- 06 *** 2.7185e-06 ** 8.8255e-06 *** 
DENS -0.0000  (0.0001) -0.0000  (0.0001)  -3.3600e- 05  -1.4929e-05  -4.8529e-05  
RET -5.0533 *** (1.6823) -4.9078 *** (1.7132)  -5.0053e+00 *** -2.2280e+00 * -7.2333e+00 *** 
GEN 0.4083  (0.2609) 0.4005 * (0.2346)  4.0841e - 01 * 1.8180e-01  5.9021e-01  
HI -4.1699 *** (1.0236) -4.1175 *** (1.0504)  -4.2016e+00 *** -1.8668e+00 * -6.0684e+00 *** 
SIGN 0.2178  (0.2214) 0.2229  (0.2144)  2.2731e- 01  1.0118e-01  3.2849e-01  
CONSTANT 7.8154 *** (0.9468) 7.6971 *** (0.9501)     
Anselin-Kelejian Test 0.1577   0.1618       
!! 0.3093   0.3122       
Moran’s I (error) 2.6170 ***        
LM (lag) 8.9340 ***        
Robust LM (lag) 3.6460 **        
LM (error) 5.6020 ***        
Robust LM (error) 0.3150         
LM (SARMA) 9.248 ***        
* p < 0.1 **; p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard error in parenthesis.
included in the analysis in order to achieve the consistency
that is not yielded by the OLS model and, at the same time, in-
corporate in the model the influence of the variables omitted
in the OLS model. We take into account the presence of en-
dogeneity in the model by constructing the spatial lag, since
this functions in the same way as including the endogenous
variable in the simultaneous equations framework, according
to Chasco (2013). In accordance with the above, in the spa-
tial literature this model is referred to as the simultaneous
autoregressive spatial model.
We use the Anselin-Kelejian test to check the existence of
spatial autocorrelation in the residuals. The results show
no spatial autocorrelation in the error term. Therefore, the
most suitable model, once again, is the mixed autoregressive
model of spatial regression, known as the lag model, which
is expressed as follows:
y = ρWy + Xβ + u (2)
where:
y: vector of observations of the dependent variable.
ρ: spatial autoregressive coefficient corresponding to the
spatially lagged variable.
Wy : vector of spatial lags of the dependent variable (spa-
tial lag of the variable y).
W: matrix of spatial weights.
X: matrix of observations of the independent variables.
β: vector of the independent variable parameters.
u: vector of random disturbances.
For our case we define the following model:
log (CDi) =Wlog(CD) + β1 GRANTSi + β2NSR i+
β3CEi + β4 APPi ++β5 INCOMEi + β6DENSi+
β7RETi + β8GENi + β9 HIi + β10 SIGNi + ui
(3)
As there is no theoretical model that specifies the most
suitable matrix for each case, in the spatial autocorrelation
test we used four types of weight functions for spatial conti-
guity matrix: queen contiguity (w1sdv), minimum distance
(dminsdv) k-nearest-neighbour (knn5sdv), and inverse dis-
tance (dinvsdv). The results of the log likelihood ratio (LR)
test2 led us to select the 5 nearest-neighbour matrix, which
best adapted to the spatial model, in line with Elhorst (2010).
The k- nearest-neighbour criterion considers the geometric
distance between regions taking into account the k nearest
neighbours of each observation. To construct the matrix se-
lected, we used information on the centroids and identified
the nearest centroid as the neighbour until the established
number of neighbours is obtained, following Herrera (2015).
This criterion ensures that all the municipalities have the
same number of neighbours and also avoids the problem
of isolation of neighbours or municipalities with too many
neighbours. Having chosen the nearest neighbour criterion,
the municipalities were represented with the binary tech-
nique that assigns values of Wij = 1 when i and j are neigh-
bours and Wij = 0 otherwise. Econometric treatment of the
data requires matrix standardisation by rows. The distances
based on the spatial weight matrix are used to interpret the
interactions of the neighbours, calculated with UTM coordin-
ates (latitude and longitude). Euclidean distance was used
to construct the matrix; that is, distance based on a straight
line and not kilometres.
Arraiz, Drukker, Kelejian and Prucha (2010), Drukker,
Egger and Prucha (2013) and Kelejian and Prucha (1998,
1999, 2010) the most prominent scholars in the spatial lit-
erature, have developed the two-stage least squares estim-
ation technique with instrumental variables and the spatial
lag model. In their work, Anselin (1988) and Bastida et
al. (2013b) propose using spatial two-stage least squares
(S2SLS) by constructing an instrument fitted to the variable
2Log likelihood for each matrix is: w1sdv (-1197.2560); dminsdv (-
1199.4940); dinvsdv (-1197.5780); knn5sdv (-1196.8860).
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Wy . Chasco (2003) and Kelejian and Robinson (1993) argue
that the spatially lagged exogenous variables are the appro-
priate instrumental variables for spatial analysis, which re-
quires the use of first-order contiguous matrices. For these
reasons, we use the logarithm of the current debt as the
instrumentalised variable, and the lagged independent vari-
ables are the instruments.
To calculate the spatial effects, we take into account the
multiplier of the matrix:
(I −ρ W )−1 βk (4)
where:
I represents the identity matrix of the order, in this case
order 1.
ρ represents the spatial parameter3 that lies between -1
and 1.
W represents the matrix.
βk is the vector of the independent variable parameters.
Results
Table 5 presents the results of the LM tests, Moran’s I
and the SARMA test that initially identified the existence of
spatial autocorrelation. The LM tests, developed by Anselin
(1988), show that a priori the spatial lag model is the most
suitable, as it is confirmed by the robust LM test (Anselin,
Bera, Florax & Yoon, 1996). Although in our case the LM
test for the residuals is significant, the robust LM test rejects
the spatial error model as the most suitable model. These
results were confirmed by the Anselin-Kelejian test, the res-
ults of which show no spatial autocorrelation in the residuals.
We therefore adopt the spatial lag model as the most suitable
option for this study.
We also take into account the possible problem of endogen-
eity by following the instrumental variables (IV) or spatially
lagged variables approach. Table 5 displays the main results.
The effects of the spatial iteration of current municipal debt,
represented by ρ= 0.32, are significant and positive. We can
therefore confirm that if current debt rises in one municip-
ality, its five nearest neighbours will also experience an in-
crease in their debt levels. Our results are in line with the
findings of Borck et al. (2015).
In addition, the interpretation of the results of the spatial
models does not directly depend on the matrix units, since
their interpretation is not based on the coefficients, due to
the feedback effects from the ρ coefficients, according to Hall
et al. (2016). That is, if an explanatory variable in one muni-
cipality undergoes changes, these changes will affect the de-
pendent variables in the other municipalities. We therefore
obtained the direct (on the diagonal of each matrix) and in-
direct (off the diagonal of each matrix) total effects according
to Elhorst (2014a, b) and LeSage and Pace (2009). The dir-
ect effect reflects how a change in a variable in municipality
i affects its current debt, and vice versa. The indirect effect
represents the effect of the change in an independent vari-
able in municipality i on the current debt of its neighbours j
and vice versa (Elhorst, 2014a; López et al., 2017).
Similarly, spatial feedback effects occur due to their expan-
sion; in other words, the spatial effects not only affect imme-
diate neighbours, but also their neighbours’ neighbours. For
this reason we limited the expansion effect to the five nearest
3Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999) and Elhorst (2014a,b).
neighbours4 through the first-order identity matrix. Having
detected the existence of spatial autocorrelation we cannot
interpret the spatial effects in the same way as the coeffi-
cients in the OLS model due to the presence of the spatial
multiplier in the matrix.5
It is also important to note that the direct and indirect ef-
fects are different for each municipality and direct interpret-
ation would be difficult since the sample in the present case
comprises 527 municipalities. This problem is addressed by
LeSage and Pace (2009), who provide the average indicators
for each of the effects.
Continuing with the analysis of Table 5, the variable grants
and transfers received (GRANTS) presents a direct spatial ef-
fect; that is, an increase in the GRANTS in one municipality
has a negative effect on its current debt. Balaguer (2002),
Bastida and Benito (2005), Benito et al. (2015a) and Pérez-
López et al. (2013) found the same results. However, this in-
crease does not affect the current debt of neighbouring muni-
cipalities. Local governments’ involvement in local taxation
systems (personal income tax, VAT, property tax, etc.) and
grants received from other government bodies to finance ser-
vices, investment in assets and public works are alternative
sources of funding to taking on debt.
Our results reveal that the coefficient of the net savings rate
(NSR) is significant and negative. Thus, H2 is supported, in
the same line as Vallés et al. (2003). That is, if a municipal-
ity’s net savings rate increases, its current debt will fall, and
to a lesser extent, its neighbours’ current debt will also de-
crease. Net savings represents local government sustainab-
ility in that if a municipality can meet its current expenses
with its current income, it will not need to get into debt. Our
results are in line with Balaguer (2002), Bastida and Benito
(2005), Brusca and Labrador (1998), Vallés et al. (2003) and
Pérez-López et al. (2013). These studies analyse this variable
as a determinant of municipal debt, but without considering
its potential spatial effects.
In a context of economic crisis, local investment may not
be significant due to the stricter controls to which it is sub-
jected.6 We deduce that local governments with high levels
of debt postpone major investments in order to stabilise their
growth and avoid excessive deficits. For this reason, we find
no significant results of spatial autocorrelation for per cap-
ita capital expenditure (CE). Neither does population density
(DENS) present evidence of spatial autocorrelation in debt.
However, when we analyse the linear model with OLS budget
variables, these are statistically significant, in line with the
literature on local debt (Bastida et al., 2009 & Benito et al.,
2015b).
One of the main contributions of this study is the intro-
duction of the average payment period to suppliers (APP) into
the analysis. The results show that this variable is highly
representative and significant, showing that compliance with
the legal limit of APP to suppliers (payment within 30 days)
reduces current debt, thus supporting H4, although it does
not affect the debt of neighbouring municipalities. To date,
given that the payment period for local government suppli-
ers has been introduced very recently, the only other contri-
bution we are aware of is the article by Pons (2017). This
author studied APP as an indicator of commercial debt, and
his findings point to significant variations of APP among the
4The results proved to be robust with the rest of the matrices.
5Calculated as the partial derivative of the dependent variable with re-
spect to changes in the explanatory variables (Elhorst, 2014a).
6The limitations on municipal investments are regulated the Organic
Law 2/2012, of April 27, on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainab-
ility (Ley Orgánica 2/2012, de 27 de abril, de Estabilidad Presupuestaria y
Sostenibilidad Financiera) in the “expenditure rule”.
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different local government groups analysed, highlighting the
high levels of non-compliance with the payment limits estab-
lished in current legislation, and municipalities’ failure to re-
port their information.
The variable per capita income (INCOME) is significant and
has positive direct and indirect effects on accumulated debt,
supporting H5. Municipalities with higher per capita income
have higher levels of current debt, coinciding with studies by
Guillamón et al. (2011), Kiewiet and Szakaty (1996) and
Vallés et al. (2003). The results of the present study are in
the same line and extend the findings of these authors. In
addition, higher income levels in one municipality positively
affect its neighbours’ debt levels, as the variable with indir-
ect effects is more significant (p <0.05), although with little
economic effect. This is due to the demand from citizens for
more public services in relation to the higher taxes they pay.
Retired people (RET), comprising people over the age of
65, has negative effects on local and neighbouring debt due
to the indirect and direct effects of spatial spillover. This vari-
able has greater economic importance since it has the highest
indirect effect, but with a low level of significance (p<0.1).
Our results are in line with Borck et al. (2015), who include
older citizens as a measure of the labour force. This stake-
holder group can be analysed from the perspective that they
do not pressurise municipalities to provide a greater number
of services.
The variable gender of the mayor (GEN) presents posit-
ive spatial autocorrelation and direct effects, confirming that
gender (woman) has positive effects on debt level. Hypo-
thesis 8 is therefore confirmed. However, its coefficient
shows a lower positive effect on debt because it is not re-
flected in the total effect. These results could be related to
spending policies. In the literature, authors such as Funk and
Philips (2018) found that in municipalities where women are
mayors the composition of local government expenditures is
different. Consequently, we believe that this aspect could af-
fect local debt.
Political strength (HI) shows negative spatial effects, both
direct and indirect, on local debt. Our results coincide with
those of Bastida et al. (2013a), Hagen and Vabo (2005) and
Roubini and Sachs (1989). According to the literature, party
political majorities enable local governments to resist pres-
sure on debt from different stakeholder groups. This is be-
cause political decisions taken by majority governments on
expenditure and investment budgets are not dependent on
coalitions with other political parties.
Finally, the political ideology of the party, whether conser-
vative or liberal, does not influence the evolution of local
debt, since this variable (SIGN) has no significant effects at
either local or neighbourhood level. Our results coincide
with those of Bastida and Benito (2005), Benito and Bastida
(2004) and Pérez-López et al. (2013) in that political ideo-
logy does not influence local debt level.
Conclusion and discussion
The aim of the present study was to analyse the spatial re-
lationships in public debt among municipalities in the Valen-
cian Community (Spain). Using spatial techniques, we ob-
serve the existence of spatial dependency of neighbouring
councils for current debt. Thus, our findings indicate that
debt should not be ignored when considering interactions
between municipalities. The influence of the spatial effects
observed in the debt could contribute to future decisions on
inter-municipal cooperation between small authorities. Such
cooperation reduces unnecessary costs in the provision of
public services as a result of economies of scale (Ferraresi,
Migali, & Rizzo, 2018; Zafra-Gómez, Prior, Plata-Díaz &
López-Hernandez, 2013) and consequently could help to re-
duce the debt.
When analysing the determinants of local debt, on the one
hand there are variables that have direct and significant ef-
fects on the debt of your municipality, such as the volume
of grants and transfers received, the average payment period
and the gender of the mayor. The volume of grants and trans-
fers received has direct negative effects at a local level; in
other words, it contributes to reducing local debt. However,
the average payment period has a direct positive effect on the
municipality’s debt. This variable may be analysed as a finan-
cial indicator of cash solvency, demonstrating that local gov-
ernments which do not pay their suppliers within the stipu-
lated period are also those with higher debt levels. In other
words, if a local government fulfils its short-term payment
obligations it avoids interest on default payments, which in
turn would cause an increase in its debt levels. Likewise, we
find a similar pattern for the gender of the mayor, which has a
direct positive effect on the level of current debt; that is, wo-
men mayors call for greater recourse to debt, although this
influence is not highly significant.
On the other hand, there are other variables that not only
have direct effects on municipal debt, but also have indirect
effects on the debt of neighbouring municipalities. This is
the case of variables such as net saving and political strength,
which have a negative direct and indirect effect on debt. A
higher net savings rate has a negative influence on a muni-
cipality’s accumulated debt and in turn, reduces the debt of
its neighbours. Thus, if a local government has greater ca-
pacity to generate additional resources (savings) once it has
fulfilled its obligations, its budgetary sustainability will be
greater. Likewise, the analysis of political strength, reveals
stronger governments can take decisions on public finances
without having to depend on the support of minority parties,
and therefore incur fewer costs and as a result, have lower
debts. In the same line, in their study of Norwegian local
municipalities Kalseth and Rattsø (1998) observed that the
more concentrated the political leadership, the lower the ad-
ministration costs. This pattern could have imitative effects
among the citizens of neighbouring municipalities, as shown
in the results of our study.
In turn, debt is affected by the socio-economic variables of
neighbouring municipalities, such as number of pensioners
and income level. The number of pensioners has negative ef-
fects on local and neighbouring debt. These results may sug-
gest that spatial dependence of debt could be defined by the
characteristics, needs and preferences of the municipality’s
inhabitants. Because the higher welfare benefits this popu-
lation group receives are paid directly by the central govern-
ment (pensions and health), they do not require some of the
social benefits directly provided through local expenditure,
therefore reducing the need to resort to borrowing. How-
ever, the capita income has a positive direct and indirect ef-
fect; that is, it affects current municipal debt and at the same
time, affects debt levels in neighbouring municipalities due
to higher demands for the provision of public services. From
an economic perspective, our findings demonstrate that the
economic level of a region influences the municipal debt of
its neighbours. This result could be explained as imitative be-
haviour (López et al., 2017). That is, if the inhabitants of a
locality have a higher economic level, they will demand bet-
ter local services and benefits that, in turn, will be demanded
by their municipal neighbours.
Finally, it is also important to note that capital expenditure
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is not significant. This result may be because municipalities
have not had to borrow to finance the low investment in in-
frastructure, due to the economic crisis and its consequent
restrictions on debt. An interesting future line of research
would be to analyse the spatial effects of this variable over a
longer time horizon, and to break down the total investment
to take into account the type of investment and its possible
spatial effects on debt.
Another future research line could be to evaluate the long-
term evolution of spatial relationships in local debt and ex-
tend the study to cover all Spanish municipalities. However,
in our study we focus only on the Valencian municipalities
due to the lack of some data for municipalities in the rest of
Spain. It would also be interesting to break down current
municipal debt into short-term and long-term payment ob-
ligations, which would allow us to analyse the spatial effects
taking into account the term of the payment of the debt.
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